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Presidential Interpretation and War Powers
Tobias T. Gibson1
Matthew R. Trout2
Scholars pay much attention to the power,3 or powers,4 of the president,
especially in regards to the extent of the expressed powers that come with
the office. However, less attention is given to one of the president’s most
powerful tools—the power of constitutional interpretation.5 This may be
because legal scholars have internalized Chief Justice John Marshall’s claim
that "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department
to say what the law is."6 However, the power of interpretation is not
exclusive to the judicial branch, in fact, both the president and Congress
have an implied power of interpretation inherent in their constitutional
functions. For the president, being able to interpret the laws is essential to
being able to enforce them.7
While Chief Justice Marshall indicates exclusivity for the judicial branch’s
role, a problem has arisen regarding presidential war powers. This
problem, which originated during the Cold War and is perhaps most

Dr. John Langton Professor of Legal Studies and Political Science, Westminster College,
Fulton, MO
2 Political Science and Security Studies major, Westminster College, Fulton, MO
3 RICHARD NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS: THE POLITICS
OF LEADERSHIP FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN 4 (1991).
4 KENNETH R. MAYER, WITH THE STROKE OF A PEN: EXEC. ORDS. AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER
4-11 (2002).; MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, THE PRESIDENT WHO WOULD NOT BE KING: EXEC.
POWER UNDER THE CONST. 95-119 (2020).
5 To be clear, we advocate for presidential constitutional interpretation to be considered a
presidential power, not merely a norm or a right.
6 Nicholas Mosvick, Marbury v. Madison and the Independent Supreme Court, CONST. CTR.
(Feb. 24, 2022), https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/blog/marbury-vmadison-and-the-independent-supreme-court; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
177 (1803).
7 Geoffrey P. Miller, The President's Power of Interpretation: Implications of a
Unified Theory of Constitutional Law, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 35, 36 (1993).
1

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL ONLINE

famously illustrated specifically during the Vietnam War,8 is that “…the
Supreme Court—has generally betrayed for over seven decades its
responsibilities to hold the executive meaningfully accountable in cases the
executive claims implicates national security,”9 thus leaving the “debate
entirely to the political process.”10
Relegating war powers to a political question has consequences. Judge
Frank Easterbrook argues that the meaning of various language and
wording can be very difficult and problematic to discern, especially within
a legal context.11 Further, Easterbrook writes that “without a settled way of
deriving meaning for an enactment, meaning lies in the selection of a rule.
The rule selection process is discretionary. Discretion belongs to judges.
And discretion is power. . .”12 But because courts defer to presidential
power in questions of war, the executive has wide discretion to push broad
readings in its favor without a serious threat of judicial intervention.
Judicial deference further allows presidential discretion due to the nature
of the political branches, where “the executive branch has a much easier
time agreeing and acting on a unified view of its powers than the legislative
branch, which is divided into two houses and pulled apart by partisan
fissures and competing committees.”13
Presidential constitutional and statutory interpretation—coupled with
judicial inaction and a lack of active congressional oversight—has allowed
presidential war powers to grow tremendously in the post-9/11 era.
Rodric B. Schoen, A Strange Silence: Vietnam and the Supreme Court, 33 Washburn L.J.
275, 275 (1994).
9 DAVID RUDENSTINE, THE AGE OF DEFERENCE: THE SUPREME COURT, NAT’L SEC., AND THE
CONST. ORD. 1, 3 (2016).
10 Steve Vladeck, The Courts Don’t Even Try to Settle Fights About War Powers Anymore,
WASHINGTON POST (Jan. 15, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/01/15/courts-dont-even-try-settle-fightsabout-war-powers-anymore/.
11 Frank H. Easterbrook, Legal Interpretation and the Power of the Judiciary, 7 HARV.
J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 87, 89 (1984).
12 Id. at 91.
13 Matthew Waxman, War Powers Oversight, Not Reform, WAR ON THE ROCKS (Nov. 19,
2019), https://warontherocks.com/2019/11/war-powers-oversight-not-reform/.
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Presidents have been able to strengthen their war powers by constructing
broad readings of relevant laws, including both post-9/11 Authorizations of
Military Force (AUMFs) and the related interpretations of presidential
constitutional authorities.14 The immediate aftermath of 9/11 saw the
passage of the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs, respectively targeting Al Qaeda and
the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq.15 The passage of the new AUMFs,
coupled with the already existing 1973 War Powers Resolution,16 created a
complicated legal web that has since become a prime target for broad
interpretation.17 The broad language and vague restrictions in each of the
laws has in practice allowed Presidents to circumvent the constitutional
safeguards meant to require congressional approval for usage of the armed
forces.
From President Obama’s military operation in Libya in 2011,18 to the war
against the Islamic State, to President Trump’s strike against Iranian
General Qassem Soleimani,19 presidents of both parties have used obscure
or vague language within existing legal frameworks to argue their military
operations or usages of force required no prior congressional authorization.
Harvard Law Professor, and co-founder of Lawfare, Jack Goldsmith, in the
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Obama's AUMF Legacy, 110 AM. J. INT'l L. 628,
629 (2016).
15 Authorization for Use of Military Force, S.J. Res 23, 107th Cong. (2001); Authorization
for Use of Military Force, H.J.Res. 114, 107th Cong. (2002)
16 The War Powers Resolution is designed to "… fulfill the intent of the framers of the
Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgment of both the
Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces
into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly
indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in
such situations." War Powers Resolution 50 U.S.C. §1541.
14

Louis Fisher, Military Operations in Libya: No War? No Hostilities?, 42 PRES. STUD. QUART.
176, 181-182, (2012). Fisher offers a specific example of how the Obama administration
used broad readings of the War Powers Resolution to justify military operations in Libya
without congressional approval. Id.
18 Id.
19 Anna Holyan & Tobias T. Gibson, Under Fire: Targeted Killing, UAVs, and Three American
Presidents, in CONTEXTUALIZING SECURITY: A READER, 119, 130-132, (Tobias T. Gibson &
Kurt W. Jefferson, eds.), (forthcoming in Aug, 2022).
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aftermath of Trump’s strike against Soleimani, describes the alarming state
of war powers in the United States as a system where “one person
decides.”20 Such a system is precisely the kind that the framers of the
Constitution were trying to avoid.21
Presidents should have a limited power of interpretation to effectively
perform their duty as an executive. However, for Congress to limit the
president in taking unilateral military action, it must start by addressing the
existing legal framework that has allowed presidents to do so. Given the
problems with the subjectivity of legal language, even if Congress is to be
extra careful in the wording of legislation, there may still be instances of
interpretative disagreement. While “nothing can truly prevent
constitutional drift and interpretational errors... specificity generally makes
it harder for readers to inadvertently or willfully misconstrue legal
documents.”22 Such specificity would at least signal a small step forward in
what has largely been a losing constitutional battle for Congress.23

Edited by Allison Frisella

Jack Goldsmith, The Soleimani Strike: One Person Decides, LAWFARE (Jan. 3, 2020),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/soleimani-strike-one-person-decides.
21 THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander Hamilton).
22 SAIKRISHNA BANGALORE PRAKASH, THE LIVING PRESIDENCY: AN ORIGINALIST ARGUMENT
AGAINST ITS EVER-EXPANDING POWERS, 67 (2020).
23 Matthew R. Trout, What the situation in Ukraine can teach us about constitutional war
powers at home, COLUMBIA MISSOURIAN (Apr. 20, 2022),
https://www.columbiamissourian.com/opinion/guest_commentaries/what-the-situationin-ukraine-can-teach-us-about-constitutional-war-powers-at-home/article_5f55c8c4-c00f11ec-bb6c-af2e93afc5d1.html.
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